Method and apparatus for applying security information in wireless communication system

ABSTRACT

A method and apparatus for applying security information in a wireless communication system is provided. A user equipment (UE) obtains first security information and second security information, applies the first security information to a first set of radio bearers (RBs) which is served by a master eNodeB (MeNB), and applies the second security information to a second set of RBs which is served by a secondary eNodeB (SeNB).

This application is a Continuation Application of U.S. patentapplication Ser. No. 14/760,368 filed on Jul. 10, 2015, which is a 35USC § 371 National Stage entry of International Application No.PCT/KR2014/000328 filed on Jan. 10, 2014, which claims priority to U.S.Provisional Application No. 61/751,284, filed on Jan. 11, 2013, all ofwhich are incorporated by reference in their entirety herein.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION Field of the Invention

The present invention relates to wireless communications, and morespecifically, to a method and apparatus for applying securityinformation in a wireless communication system.

Related Art

Universal mobile telecommunications system (UMTS) is a 3^(rd) generation(3G) asynchronous mobile communication system operating in wideband codedivision multiple access (WCDMA) based on European systems, globalsystem for mobile communications (GSM) and general packet radio services(GPRS). A long-term evolution (LTE) of UMTS is under discussion by the3^(rd) generation partnership project (3GPP) that standardized UMTS.

The 3GPP LTE is a technology for enabling high-speed packetcommunications. Many schemes have been proposed for the LTE objectiveincluding those that aim to reduce user and provider costs, improveservice quality, and expand and improve coverage and system capacity.The 3GPP LTE requires reduced cost per bit, increased serviceavailability, flexible use of a frequency band, a simple structure, anopen interface, and adequate power consumption of a terminal as anupper-level requirement.

Small cells using low power nodes are considered promising to cope withmobile traffic explosion, especially for hotspot deployments in indoorand outdoor scenarios. A low-power node generally means a node whosetransmission (Tx) power is lower than macro node and base station (BS)classes, for example a pico and femto eNodeB (eNB) are both applicable.Small cell enhancements for 3GPP LTE will focus on additionalfunctionalities for enhanced performance in hotspot areas for indoor andoutdoor using low power nodes.

Some of activities will focus on achieving an even higher degree ofinterworking between the macro and low-power layers, including differentforms of macro assistance to the low-power layer and dual-layerconnectivity. Dual connectivity implies that the device has simultaneousconnections to both macro and low-power layers. Macro assistanceincluding dual connectivity may provide several benefits:

-   -   Enhanced support for mobility—by maintaining the mobility anchor        point in the macro layer, it is possible to maintain seamless        mobility between macro and low-power layers, as well as between        low-power nodes.    -   Low overhead transmissions from the low-power layer—by        transmitting only information required for individual user        experience, it is possible to avoid overhead coming from        supporting idle-mode mobility within the local-area layer, for        example.    -   Energy-efficient load balancing—by turning off the low-power        nodes when there is no ongoing data transmission, it is possible        to reduce the energy consumption of the low-power layer.    -   Per-link optimization—by being able to select the termination        point for uplink and downlink separately, the node selection can        be optimized for each link.

To support the dual connectivity, various changes may be required incurrent 3GPP LTE radio protocols. For example, a method for applyingsecurity information when the dual connectivity is introduced may berequired.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

The present invention provides a method and apparatus for applyingsecurity information in a wireless communication system. The presentinvention provides a method for applying security information in dualconnectivity. The present invention also provides a method for applyingdifferent security information to different sets of radio bearers whichis served by a master eNodeB (MeNB) and a secondary eNodeB (SeNB)respectively.

In an aspect, a method for applying, by a user equipment (UE), securityinformation in a wireless communication system is provided. The methodincludes obtaining first security information and second securityinformation, applying the first security information to a first set ofradio bearers (RBs) which is served by a master eNodeB (MeNB), andapplying the second security information to a second set of RBs which isserved by a secondary eNodeB (SeNB).

The first security information may include at least one of a firstsecurity parameter and a first security key, and the second securityinformation may include at least one of a second security parameter anda second security key.

The method may further include deriving the first security key based onthe first security parameter.

The first security key may be KRRCint, KRRCenc, or KUPenc for the MeNB.

The method may further include deriving the second security key from thefirst security key with the first security parameter.

The second security key may be KRRCint, KRRCenc, or KUPenc for the SeNB.

Obtaining the first security information may include receiving the firstsecurity information from the MeNB via a security mode command message.

Obtaining the second security information may include receiving thesecond security information from the MeNB via a security mode commandmessage.

The first security information may be applied to one or more cells ofthe MeNB.

The second security information may be applied to one or more cells ofthe SeNB.

The UE may have a first connection with the MeNB for signaling.

The first connection may be a radio resource control (RRC) connection.

The UE may have a second connection with the SeNB for a user traffic.

The second connection may be an L2 connection.

In another aspect, a user equipment (UE) in a wireless communicationsystem is provided. The UE includes a radio frequency (RF) unit fortransmitting or receiving a radio signal, and a processor coupled to theRF unit, and configured to obtain first security information and secondsecurity information, apply the first security information to a firstset of radio bearers (RBs) which is served by a master eNodeB (MeNB),and apply the second security information to a second set of RBs whichis served by a secondary eNodeB (SeNB).

Security information can be applied efficiently in dual connectivity.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

FIG. 1 shows LTE system architecture.

FIG. 2 shows a control plane of a radio interface protocol of an LTEsystem.

FIG. 3 shows a user plane of a radio interface protocol of an LTEsystem.

FIG. 4 shows an example of a physical channel structure.

FIG. 5 shows deployment scenarios of small cells with/without macrocoverage.

FIG. 6 shows a key derivation for an AS security and NAS security excepthandover.

FIG. 7 shows an initial activation of AS security.

FIG. 8 shows a scenario of dual connectivity.

FIG. 9 shows an example of a method for applying security informationaccording to an embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 10 shows how a UE and MeNB generate security keys for radio RBsbetween the UE and macro cell according to an embodiment of the presentinvention.

FIG. 11 shows how a UE and SeNB generate security keys for radio RBsbetween the UE and small cell according to an embodiment of the presentinvention.

FIG. 12 is a block diagram showing wireless communication system toimplement an embodiment of the present invention.

DESCRIPTION OF EXEMPLARY EMBODIMENTS

The technology described below can be used in various wirelesscommunication systems such as code division multiple access (CDMA),frequency division multiple access (FDMA), time division multiple access(TDMA), orthogonal frequency division multiple access (OFDMA), singlecarrier frequency division multiple access (SC-FDMA), etc. The CDMA canbe implemented with a radio technology such as universal terrestrialradio access (UTRA) or CDMA-2000. The TDMA can be implemented with aradio technology such as global system for mobile communications(GSM)/general packet ratio service (GPRS)/enhanced data rate for GSMevolution (EDGE). The OFDMA can be implemented with a radio technologysuch as institute of electrical and electronics engineers (IEEE) 802.11(Wi-Fi), IEEE 802.16 (WiMAX), IEEE 802.20, evolved UTRA (E-UTRA), etc.IEEE 802.16m is evolved from IEEE 802.16e, and provides backwardcompatibility with a system based on the IEEE 802.16e. The UTRA is apart of a universal mobile telecommunication system (UMTS). 3^(rd)generation partnership project (3GPP) long term evolution (LTE) is apart of an evolved UMTS (E-UMTS) using the E-UTRA. The 3GPP LTE uses theOFDMA in a downlink and uses the SC-FDMA in an uplink. LTE-advanced(LTE-A) is an evolution of the LTE.

For clarity, the following description will focus on LTE-A. However,technical features of the present invention are not limited thereto.

FIG. 1 shows LTE system architecture. The communication network iswidely deployed to provide a variety of communication services such asvoice over internet protocol (VoIP) through IMS and packet data.

Referring to FIG. 1, the LTE system architecture includes one or moreuser equipment (UE; 10), an evolved-UMTS terrestrial radio accessnetwork (E-UTRAN) and an evolved packet core (EPC). The UE 10 refers toa communication equipment carried by a user. The UE 10 may be fixed ormobile, and may be referred to as another terminology, such as a mobilestation (MS), a user terminal (UT), a subscriber station (SS), awireless device, etc.

The E-UTRAN includes one or more evolved node-B (eNB) 20, and aplurality of UEs may be located in one cell. The eNB 20 provides an endpoint of a control plane and a user plane to the UE 10. The eNB 20 isgenerally a fixed station that communicates with the UE 10 and may bereferred to as another terminology, such as a base station (BS), a basetransceiver system (BTS), an access point, etc. One eNB 20 may bedeployed per cell. There are one or more cells within the coverage ofthe eNB 20. A single cell is configured to have one of bandwidthsselected from 1.25, 2.5, 5, 10, and 20 MHz, etc., and provides downlinkor uplink transmission services to several UEs. In this case, differentcells can be configured to provide different bandwidths.

Hereinafter, a downlink (DL) denotes communication from the eNB 20 tothe UE 10, and an uplink (UL) denotes communication from the UE 10 tothe eNB 20. In the DL, a transmitter may be a part of the eNB 20, and areceiver may be a part of the UE 10. In the UL, the transmitter may be apart of the UE 10, and the receiver may be a part of the eNB 20.

The EPC includes a mobility management entity (MME) which is in chargeof control plane functions, and a system architecture evolution (SAE)gateway (S-GW) which is in charge of user plane functions. The MME/S-GW30 may be positioned at the end of the network and connected to anexternal network. The MME has UE access information or UE capabilityinformation, and such information may be primarily used in UE mobilitymanagement. The S-GW is a gateway of which an endpoint is an E-UTRAN.The MME/S-GW 30 provides an end point of a session and mobilitymanagement function for the UE 10. The EPC may further include a packetdata network (PDN) gateway (PDN-GW). The PDN-GW is a gateway of which anendpoint is a PDN.

The MME provides various functions including non-access stratum (NAS)signaling to eNBs 20, NAS signaling security, access stratum (AS)security control, Inter core network (CN) node signaling for mobilitybetween 3GPP access networks, idle mode UE reachability (includingcontrol and execution of paging retransmission), tracking area listmanagement (for UE in idle and active mode), P-GW and S-GW selection,MME selection for handovers with MME change, serving GPRS support node(SGSN) selection for handovers to 2G or 3G 3GPP access networks,roaming, authentication, bearer management functions including dedicatedbearer establishment, support for public warning system (PWS) (whichincludes earthquake and tsunami warning system (ETWS) and commercialmobile alert system (CMAS)) message transmission. The S-GW host providesassorted functions including per-user based packet filtering (by e.g.,deep packet inspection), lawful interception, UE Internet protocol (IP)address allocation, transport level packet marking in the DL, UL and DLservice level charging, gating and rate enforcement, DL rate enforcementbased on APN-AMBR. For clarity MME/S-GW 30 will be referred to hereinsimply as a “gateway,” but it is understood that this entity includesboth the MME and S-GW.

Interfaces for transmitting user traffic or control traffic may be used.The UE 10 and the eNB 20 are connected by means of a Uu interface. TheeNBs 20 are interconnected by means of an X2 interface. Neighboring eNBsmay have a meshed network structure that has the X2 interface. The eNBs20 are connected to the EPC by means of an S1 interface. The eNBs 20 areconnected to the MME by means of an S1-MME interface, and are connectedto the S-GW by means of S1-U interface. The S1 interface supports amany-to-many relation between the eNB 20 and the MME/S-GW.

The eNB 20 may perform functions of selection for gateway 30, routingtoward the gateway 30 during a radio resource control (RRC) activation,scheduling and transmitting of paging messages, scheduling andtransmitting of broadcast channel (BCH) information, dynamic allocationof resources to the UEs 10 in both UL and DL, configuration andprovisioning of eNB measurements, radio bearer control, radio admissioncontrol (RAC), and connection mobility control in LTE_ACTIVE state. Inthe EPC, and as noted above, gateway 30 may perform functions of pagingorigination, LTE_IDLE state management, ciphering of the user plane, SAEbearer control, and ciphering and integrity protection of NAS signaling.

FIG. 2 shows a control plane of a radio interface protocol of an LTEsystem. FIG. 3 shows a user plane of a radio interface protocol of anLTE system.

Layers of a radio interface protocol between the UE and the E-UTRAN maybe classified into a first layer (L), a second layer (L2), and a thirdlayer (L3) based on the lower three layers of the open systeminterconnection (OSI) model that is well-known in the communicationsystem. The radio interface protocol between the UE and the E-UTRAN maybe horizontally divided into a physical layer, a data link layer, and anetwork layer, and may be vertically divided into a control plane(C-plane) which is a protocol stack for control signal transmission anda user plane (U-plane) which is a protocol stack for data informationtransmission. The layers of the radio interface protocol exist in pairsat the UE and the E-UTRAN, and are in charge of data transmission of theUu interface.

A physical (PHY) layer belongs to the L1. The PHY layer provides ahigher layer with an information transfer service through a physicalchannel. The PHY layer is connected to a medium access control (MAC)layer, which is a higher layer of the PHY layer, through a transportchannel. A physical channel is mapped to the transport channel. Data istransferred between the MAC layer and the PHY layer through thetransport channel. Between different PHY layers, i.e., a PHY layer of atransmitter and a PHY layer of a receiver, data is transferred throughthe physical channel using radio resources. The physical channel ismodulated using an orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM)scheme, and utilizes time and frequency as a radio resource.

The PHY layer uses several physical control channels. A physicaldownlink control channel (PDCCH) reports to a UE about resourceallocation of a paging channel (PCH) and a downlink shared channel(DL-SCH), and hybrid automatic repeat request (HARQ) information relatedto the DL-SCH. The PDCCH may carry a UL grant for reporting to the UEabout resource allocation of UL transmission. A physical control formatindicator channel (PCFICH) reports the number of OFDM symbols used forPDCCHs to the UE, and is transmitted in every subframe. A physicalhybrid ARQ indicator channel (PHICH) carries an HARQ acknowledgement(ACK)/non-acknowledgement (NACK) signal in response to UL transmission.A physical uplink control channel (PUCCH) carries UL control informationsuch as HARQ ACK/NACK for DL transmission, scheduling request, and CQI.A physical uplink shared channel (PUSCH) carries a UL-uplink sharedchannel (SCH).

FIG. 4 shows an example of a physical channel structure.

A physical channel consists of a plurality of subframes in time domainand a plurality of subcarriers in frequency domain. One subframeconsists of a plurality of symbols in the time domain. One subframeconsists of a plurality of resource blocks (RBs). One RB consists of aplurality of symbols and a plurality of subcarriers. In addition, eachsubframe may use specific subcarriers of specific symbols of acorresponding subframe for a PDCCH. For example, a first symbol of thesubframe may be used for the PDCCH. The PDCCH carries dynamic allocatedresources, such as a physical resource block (PRB) and modulation andcoding scheme (MCS). A transmission time interval (TTI) which is a unittime for data transmission may be equal to a length of one subframe. Thelength of one subframe may be 1 ms.

The transport channel is classified into a common transport channel anda dedicated transport channel according to whether the channel is sharedor not. A DL transport channel for transmitting data from the network tothe UE includes a broadcast channel (BCH) for transmitting systeminformation, a paging channel (PCH) for transmitting a paging message, aDL-SCH for transmitting user traffic or control signals, etc. The DL-SCHsupports HARQ, dynamic link adaptation by varying the modulation, codingand transmit power, and both dynamic and semi-static resourceallocation. The DL-SCH also may enable broadcast in the entire cell andthe use of beamforming. The system information carries one or moresystem information blocks. All system information blocks may betransmitted with the same periodicity. Traffic or control signals of amultimedia broadcast/multicast service (MBMS) may be transmitted throughthe DL-SCH or a multicast channel (MCH).

A UL transport channel for transmitting data from the UE to the networkincludes a random access channel (RACH) for transmitting an initialcontrol message, a UL-SCH for transmitting user traffic or controlsignals, etc. The UL-SCH supports HARQ and dynamic link adaptation byvarying the transmit power and potentially modulation and coding. TheUL-SCH also may enable the use of beamforming. The RACH is normally usedfor initial access to a cell.

A MAC layer belongs to the L2. The MAC layer provides services to aradio link control (RLC) layer, which is a higher layer of the MAClayer, via a logical channel. The MAC layer provides a function ofmapping multiple logical channels to multiple transport channels. TheMAC layer also provides a function of logical channel multiplexing bymapping multiple logical channels to a single transport channel. A MACsublayer provides data transfer services on logical channels.

The logical channels are classified into control channels fortransferring control plane information and traffic channels fortransferring user plane information, according to a type of transmittedinformation. That is, a set of logical channel types is defined fordifferent data transfer services offered by the MAC layer. The logicalchannels are located above the transport channel, and are mapped to thetransport channels.

The control channels are used for transfer of control plane informationonly. The control channels provided by the MAC layer include a broadcastcontrol channel (BCCH), a paging control channel (PCCH), a commoncontrol channel (CCCH), a multicast control channel (MCCH) and adedicated control channel (DCCH). The BCCH is a downlink channel forbroadcasting system control information. The PCCH is a downlink channelthat transfers paging information and is used when the network does notknow the location cell of a UE. The CCCH is used by UEs having no RRCconnection with the network. The MCCH is a point-to-multipoint downlinkchannel used for transmitting MBMS control information from the networkto a UE. The DCCH is a point-to-point bi-directional channel used by UEshaving an RRC connection that transmits dedicated control informationbetween a UE and the network.

Traffic channels are used for the transfer of user plane informationonly. The traffic channels provided by the MAC layer include a dedicatedtraffic channel (DTCH) and a multicast traffic channel (MTCH). The DTCHis a point-to-point channel, dedicated to one UE for the transfer ofuser information and can exist in both uplink and downlink. The MTCH isa point-to-multipoint downlink channel for transmitting traffic datafrom the network to the UE.

Uplink connections between logical channels and transport channelsinclude the DCCH that can be mapped to the UL-SCH, the DTCH that can bemapped to the UL-SCH and the CCCH that can be mapped to the UL-SCH.Downlink connections between logical channels and transport channelsinclude the BCCH that can be mapped to the BCH or DL-SCH, the PCCH thatcan be mapped to the PCH, the DCCH that can be mapped to the DL-SCH, andthe DTCH that can be mapped to the DL-SCH, the MCCH that can be mappedto the MCH, and the MTCH that can be mapped to the MCH.

An RLC layer belongs to the L2. The RLC layer provides a function ofadjusting a size of data, so as to be suitable for a lower layer totransmit the data, by concatenating and segmenting the data receivedfrom an upper layer in a radio section. In addition, to ensure a varietyof quality of service (QoS) required by a radio bearer (RB), the RLClayer provides three operation modes, i.e., a transparent mode (TM), anunacknowledged mode (UM), and an acknowledged mode (AM). The AM RLCprovides a retransmission function through an automatic repeat request(ARQ) for reliable data transmission. Meanwhile, a function of the RLClayer may be implemented with a functional block inside the MAC layer.In this case, the RLC layer may not exist.

A packet data convergence protocol (PDCP) layer belongs to the L2. ThePDCP layer provides a function of header compression function thatreduces unnecessary control information such that data being transmittedby employing IP packets, such as IPv4 or IPv6, can be efficientlytransmitted over a radio interface that has a relatively smallbandwidth. The header compression increases transmission efficiency inthe radio section by transmitting only necessary information in a headerof the data. In addition, the PDCP layer provides a function ofsecurity. The function of security includes ciphering which preventsinspection of third parties, and integrity protection which preventsdata manipulation of third parties.

A radio resource control (RRC) layer belongs to the L3. The RLC layer islocated at the lowest portion of the L3, and is only defined in thecontrol plane. The RRC layer takes a role of controlling a radioresource between the UE and the network. For this, the UE and thenetwork exchange an RRC message through the RRC layer. The RRC layercontrols logical channels, transport channels, and physical channels inrelation to the configuration, reconfiguration, and release of RBs. AnRB is a logical path provided by the L1 and L2 for data delivery betweenthe UE and the network. That is, the RB signifies a service provided theL2 for data transmission between the UE and E-UTRAN. The configurationof the RB implies a process for specifying a radio protocol layer andchannel properties to provide a particular service and for determiningrespective detailed parameters and operations. The RB is classified intotwo types, i.e., a signaling RB (SRB) and a data RB (DRB). The SRB isused as a path for transmitting an RRC message in the control plane. TheDRB is used as a path for transmitting user data in the user plane.

Referring to FIG. 2, the RLC and MAC layers (terminated in the eNB onthe network side) may perform functions such as scheduling, automaticrepeat request (ARQ), and hybrid automatic repeat request (HARQ). TheRRC layer (terminated in the eNB on the network side) may performfunctions such as broadcasting, paging, RRC connection management, RBcontrol, mobility functions, and UE measurement reporting andcontrolling. The NAS control protocol (terminated in the MME of gatewayon the network side) may perform functions such as a SAE bearermanagement, authentication, LTE_IDLE mobility handling, pagingorigination in LTE_IDLE, and security control for the signaling betweenthe gateway and UE.

Referring to FIG. 3, the RLC and MAC layers (terminated in the eNB onthe network side) may perform the same functions for the control plane.The PDCP layer (terminated in the eNB on the network side) may performthe user plane functions such as header compression, integrityprotection, and ciphering.

An RRC state indicates whether an RRC layer of the UE is logicallyconnected to an RRC layer of the E-UTRAN. The RRC state may be dividedinto two different states such as an RRC connected state and an RRC idlestate. When an RRC connection is established between the RRC layer ofthe UE and the RRC layer of the E-UTRAN, the UE is in RRC_CONNECTED, andotherwise the UE is in RRC_IDLE. Since the UE in RRC_CONNECTED has theRRC connection established with the E-UTRAN, the E-UTRAN may recognizethe existence of the UE in RRC_CONNECTED and may effectively control theUE. Meanwhile, the UE in RRC_IDLE may not be recognized by the E-UTRAN,and a CN manages the UE in unit of a TA which is a larger area than acell. That is, only the existence of the UE in RRC_IDLE is recognized inunit of a large area, and the UE must transition to RRC_CONNECTED toreceive a typical mobile communication service such as voice or datacommunication.

In RRC_IDLE state, the UE may receive broadcasts of system informationand paging information while the UE specifies a discontinuous reception(DRX) configured by NAS, and the UE has been allocated an identification(ID) which uniquely identifies the UE in a tracking area and may performpublic land mobile network (PLMN) selection and cell re-selection. Also,in RRC_IDLE state, no RRC context is stored in the eNB.

In RRC_CONNECTED state, the UE has an E-UTRAN RRC connection and acontext in the E-UTRAN, such that transmitting and/or receiving datato/from the eNB becomes possible. Also, the UE can report channelquality information and feedback information to the eNB. InRRC_CONNECTED state, the E-UTRAN knows the cell to which the UE belongs.Therefore, the network can transmit and/or receive data to/from UE, thenetwork can control mobility (handover and inter-radio accesstechnologies (RAT) cell change order to GSM EDGE radio access network(GERAN) with network assisted cell change (NACC)) of the UE, and thenetwork can perform cell measurements for a neighboring cell.

In RRC_IDLE state, the UE specifies the paging DRX cycle. Specifically,the UE monitors a paging signal at a specific paging occasion of everyUE specific paging DRX cycle. The paging occasion is a time intervalduring which a paging signal is transmitted. The UE has its own pagingoccasion.

A paging message is transmitted over all cells belonging to the sametracking area. If the UE moves from one TA to another TA, the UE willsend a tracking area update (TAU) message to the network to update itslocation.

When the user initially powers on the UE, the UE first searches for aproper cell and then remains in RRC_IDLE in the cell. When there is aneed to establish an RRC connection, the UE which remains in RRC_IDLEestablishes the RRC connection with the RRC of the E-UTRAN through anRRC connection procedure and then may transition to RRC_CONNECTED. TheUE which remains in RRC_IDLE may need to establish the RRC connectionwith the E-UTRAN when uplink data transmission is necessary due to auser's call attempt or the like or when there is a need to transmit aresponse message upon receiving a paging message from the E-UTRAN.

It is known that different cause values may be mapped o the signaturesequence used to transmit messages between a UE and eNB and that eitherchannel quality indicator (CQI) or path loss and cause or message sizeare candidates for inclusion in the initial preamble.

When a UE wishes to access the network and determines a message to betransmitted, the message may be linked to a purpose and a cause valuemay be determined. The size of the ideal message may be also bedetermined by identifying all optional information and differentalternative sizes, such as by removing optional information, or analternative scheduling request message may be used.

The UE acquires necessary information for the transmission of thepreamble, UL interference, pilot transmit power and requiredsignal-to-noise ratio (SNR) for the preamble detection at the receiveror combinations thereof. This information must allow the calculation ofthe initial transmit power of the preamble. It is beneficial to transmitthe UL message in the vicinity of the preamble from a frequency point ofview in order to ensure that the same channel is used for thetransmission of the message.

The UE should take into account the UL interference and the UL path lossin order to ensure that the network receives the preamble with a minimumSNR. The UL interference can be determined only in the eNB, andtherefore, must be broadcast by the eNB and received by the UE prior tothe transmission of the preamble. The UL path loss can be considered tobe similar to the DL path loss and can be estimated by the UE from thereceived RX signal strength when the transmit power of some pilotsequence of the cell is known to the UE.

The required UL SNR for the detection of the preamble would typicallydepend on the eNB configuration, such as a number of Rx antennas andreceiver performance. There may be advantages to transmit the ratherstatic transmit power of the pilot and the necessary UL SNR separatelyfrom the varying UL interference and possibly the power offset requiredbetween the preamble and the message.

The initial transmission power of the preamble can be roughly calculatedaccording to the following formula:Transmit power=TransmitPilot−RxPilot+ULInterference+Offset+SNRRequired

Therefore, any combination of SNRRequired, ULInterference, TransmitPilotand Offset can be broadcast. In principle, only one value must bebroadcast. This is essentially in current UMTS systems, although the ULinterference in 3GPP LTE will mainly be neighboring cell interferencethat is probably more constant than in UMTS system.

The UE determines the initial UL transit power for the transmission ofthe preamble as explained above. The receiver in the eNB is able toestimate the absolute received power as well as the relative receivedpower compared to the interference in the cell. The eNB will consider apreamble detected if the received signal power compared to theinterference is above an eNB known threshold.

The UE performs power ramping in order to ensure that a UE can bedetected even if the initially estimated transmission power of thepreamble is not adequate. Another preamble will most likely betransmitted if no ACK or NACK is received by the UE before the nextrandom access attempt. The transmit power of the preamble can beincreased, and/or the preamble can be transmitted on a different ULfrequency in order to increase the probability of detection. Therefore,the actual transmit power of the preamble that will be detected does notnecessarily correspond to the initial transmit power of the preamble asinitially calculated by the UE.

The UE must determine the possible UL transport format. The transportformat, which may include MCS and a number of resource blocks thatshould be used by the UE, depends mainly on two parameters, specificallythe SNR at the eNB and the required size of the message to betransmitted.

In practice, a maximum UE message size, or payload, and a requiredminimum SNR correspond to each transport format. In UMTS, the UEdetermines before the transmission of the preamble whether a transportformat can be chosen for the transmission according to the estimatedinitial preamble transmit power, the required offset between preambleand the transport block, the maximum allowed or available UE transmitpower, a fixed offset and additional margin. The preamble in UMTS neednot contain any information regarding the transport format selected bythe EU since the network does not need to reserve time and frequencyresources and, therefore, the transport format is indicated togetherwith the transmitted message.

The eNB must be aware of the size of the message that the UE intends totransmit and the SNR achievable by the UE in order to select the correcttransport format upon reception of the preamble and then reserve thenecessary time and frequency resources. Therefore, the eNB cannotestimate the SNR achievable by the EU according to the received preamblebecause the UE transmit power compared to the maximum allowed orpossible UE transmit power is not known to the eNB, given that the UEwill most likely consider the measured path loss in the DL or someequivalent measure for the determination of the initial preambletransmission power.

The eNB could calculate a difference between the path loss estimated inthe DL compared and the path loss of the UL. However, this calculationis not possible if power ramping is used and the UE transmit power forthe preamble does not correspond to the initially calculated UE transmitpower. Furthermore, the precision of the actual UE transmit power andthe transmit power at which the UE is intended to transmit is very low.Therefore, it has been proposed to code the path loss or CQI estimationof the downlink and the message size or the cause value In the UL in thesignature.

FIG. 5 shows deployment scenarios of small cells with/without macrocoverage. It may be referred to Section 6.1 of 3GPP TR 36.932 V12.0.0(2012-12). Small cell enhancement should target both with and withoutmacro coverage, both outdoor and indoor small cell deployments and bothideal and non-ideal backhaul. Both sparse and dense small celldeployments should be considered.

Referring to FIG. 5, small cell enhancement should target the deploymentscenario in which small cell nodes are deployed under the coverage ofone or more than one overlaid E-UTRAN macro-cell layer(s) in order toboost the capacity of already deployed cellular network. Two scenarioswhere the UE is in coverage of both the macro cell and the small cellsimultaneously, and where the UE is not in coverage of both the macrocell and the small cell simultaneously can be considered. Also, thedeployment scenario where small cell nodes are not deployed under thecoverage of one or more overlaid E-UTRAN macro-cell layer(s) may beconsidered.

Small cell enhancement should target both outdoor and indoor small celldeployments. The small cell nodes could be deployed indoors or outdoors,and in either case could provide service to indoor or outdoor UEs.

Security function is described.

The security function provides integrity protection and ciphering. Theintegrity protection prevents user data and signaling from being alteredin an unauthorized manner, and the ciphering provides confidentiality ofuser data and signaling.

There are two levels of security between the UE and the network.

1) AS security: The AS security protects the RRC signaling and the userdata between the UE and the E-UTRAN. It provides integrity protectionand ciphering of the RRC signaling on the control plane of the radioprotocols. It also provides ciphering of the user data on the user planeof the radio protocols. The security mode command procedure in the RRCis used to activate the AS security between the UE and the E-UTRAN.

2) NAS security: The NAS security protects the NAS signaling between theUE and the MME. It provides integrity protection and ciphering of theNAS signaling. The security mode command procedure in the NAS is used toactivate the NAS security between the UE and the MME.

FIG. 6 shows a key derivation for an AS security and NAS security excepthandover.

The security function between the UE and the network is based on thesecret key called K_(ASME). The K_(ASME) is derived from the permanentkey that is stored in both the universal subscriber identity module(USIM) and the home subscriber server (HSS). The MME receives theK_(ASME) from the HSS. The UE derives the K_(ASME) as a result of theauthentication and key agreement (AKA) procedure in the NAS protocols.During the AKA procedure, the UE and the network perform mutualauthentication and agree on the K_(ASME).

The UE and the MME derive the K_(NASint) for integrity protection of theNAS messages and the K_(NASenc) for ciphering of the NAS messages byusing the K_(ASME). The UE and the eNB derive the K_(eNB) from theK_(ASME) for protection of signaling and user data on the Uu interfacebetween the UE and the eNB. From the K_(eNB), the UE and the eNB derivethe K_(RRCint) for integrity protection of the RRC messages, theK_(RRCenc) for ciphering of the RRC messages, and the K_(UPenc) forciphering of user data.

The four AS keys (K_(eNB), K_(RRCint), K_(RRCenc), and K_(UPenc)) changeupon every handover and connection re-establishment. For handover from asource eNB to a target eNB, the UE and the source eNB derive theK_(eNB)*which is a new K_(eNB) used at the target cell. The other ASkeys, i.e., K_(RRCint), K_(RRCenc), and K_(UPenc), are derived from theK_(eNB)*. The K_(eNB)* is derived based on either the current K_(eNB) ora fresh next hop (NH) in the UE and the eNB. The physical cell ID anddownlink carrier frequency of the target cell are also used forderivation of the K_(eNB)*. The NH is derived in the UE and the MME fromthe K_(ASME). The eNB receives the NH from the MME to derive theK_(eNB)* for handovers. An intra-cell handover procedure may be used tochange the AS keys in RRC_CONNECTED.

Activation of the AS security is initiated by the eNB after the initialcontext setup procedure over the S1 interface is initiated by the MME.During the initial context setup procedure, the MME informs the eNBabout the K_(eNB) derived directly from K_(ASME) for AS key derivationand the algorithms of integrity protection and ciphering supported inthe UE. Thus, after receiving the K_(eNB) and the algorithms from theMME, the eNB can initiate activation of AS security with the UE.

FIG. 7 shows an initial activation of AS security.

For initial activation of AS security, in step S50, the eNB transmitsthe SecurityModeCommand message indicating the integrity protectionalgorithm and the ciphering algorithm to the RRC layer of the UE afterthe RRC connection establishment procedure is completed.

The RRC layer of the UE receives the SecurityModeCommand message beforeconfiguring the PDCP layer of the UE to apply integrity protection.Thus, in step S51, upon receiving the SecurityModeCommand message, theRRC layer of the UE decodes the SecurityModeCommand message, and derivesthe K_(RRCint) for integrity protection of the RRC messages with thealgorithm indicated by the received SecurityModeCommand message. In stepS52, the RRC layer of the UE requests the PDCP layer of the UE to verifythe integrity of the received SecurityModeCommand message using thealgorithm and the K_(RRCint).

Note that the SecurityModeCommand message is transmitted with integrityprotection even though the AS security is not activated in the UE. Thisis because the UE can verify the integrity of the message using thealgorithm included in the message. However, ciphering is not applied tothe SecurityModeCommand message because the UE cannot decode the messageuntil the ciphering algorithm included in the message is applied.

In step S53, the PDCP layer of the UE verifies the integrity of theSecurityModeCommand message. In step S54, the PDCP layer of the UEtransmits a result of the integrity verification. If the UE fails toverify the integrity of SecurityModeCommand message, the UE transmitsthe SecurityModeFailure message to the eNB in response to theSecurityModeCommand message. In this case, neither integrity protectionnor ciphering is applied to the SecurityModeFailure message becausevalid algorithms are not available in the UE.

If the received SecurityModeCommand message passes the integrityverification in the PDCP layer of the UE, the RRC layer of the UEfurther derives the K_(RRCenc) and the K_(UPenc). In step S55, the RRClayer of the UE configures the PDCP layer of the UE to apply integrityprotection using the integrity protection algorithm and the K_(RRCint),and to apply ciphering using the ciphering algorithm, the K_(RRCenc),and the K_(UPenc). Then, in step S56, the UE considers AS security to beactivated, and applies both integrity protection and ciphering to allsubsequent RRC messages received and sent by the UE.

Upon the activation of AS security, in step S57, the RRC layer of the UEtransmits the SecurityModeComplete message to the eNB in response to theSecurityModeCommand message. The SecurityModeComplete message isintegrity protected but not ciphered. The reason for not applyingciphering to the SecurityModeComplete message is that by transmittingboth response messages, i.e., SecurityModeFailure andSecurityModeComplete messages, unciphered, the eNB can easily decode theresponse message without deciphering regardless of whether the securityactivation is successful or not in the UE.

After AS security is activated, the eNB establishes SRB2 and DRBs. TheeNB does not establish SRB2 and DRBs prior to activating AS security.Once AS security is activated, all RRC messages over SRB1 and SRB2 areintegrity protected and ciphered, and all user data over DRBs areciphered by the PDCP layer. However, neither integrity protection norciphering applies for SRB0.

The integrity protection algorithm is common for signaling radio bearersSRB1 and SRB2, and the ciphering algorithm is common for all radiobearers (i.e., SRB1, SRB2, and DRBs). The integrity protection andciphering algorithms can be changed only upon handover.

A secondary cell (SCell) configuration is described

SCell addition/modification is described first. It may be referred toSection 5.3.10.3b of 3GPP TS 36.331 V11.1.0 (2012-09). The UE shall:

1> for each sCellIndex value included in the sCellToAddModList that isnot part of the current UE configuration (SCell addition):

2> add the SCell, corresponding to the cellIdentification, in accordancewith the received radioResourceConfigCommonSCell andradioResourceConfigDedicatedSCell;

2> configure lower layers to consider the SCell to be in deactivatedstate;

1> for each sCellIndex value included in the sCellToAddModList that ispart of the current UE configuration (SCell modification):

2> modify the SCell configuration in accordance with the receivedradioResourceConfigDedicatedSCell.

SCell release is described. It may be referred to Section 5.3.10.3a of3GPP TS 36.331 V11.1.0 (2012-09). The UE shall:

1> if the release is triggered by reception of the sCellToReleaseList:

2> for each sCellIndex value included in the sCellToReleaseList:

3> if the current UE configuration includes an SCell with valuesCellIndex:

4> release the SCell;

1> if the release is triggered by RRC connection re-establishment:

2> release all SCells that are part of the current UE configuration.

Dual connectivity for small cell enhancement has been studied. Dualconnectivity may imply:

-   -   Control and data separation where, for instance, the control        signaling for mobility is provided via the macro layer at the        same time as high-speed data connectivity is provided via the        low-power layer.    -   A separation between downlink and uplink, where downlink and        uplink connectivity is provided via different layers.    -   Diversity for control signaling, where radio resource control        (RRC) signaling may be provided via multiple links, further        enhancing mobility performance.

FIG. 8 shows a scenario of dual connectivity.

Referring to FIG. 8, the UE has an RRC connection with the master eNB(hereinafter, MeNB). In dual connectivity, the MeNB controls the macrocell, and is the eNB which terminates at least S1-MME and therefore actas mobility anchor towards the CN. Also, the UE has a radio link withthe secondary eNB (hereinafter, SeNB). In dual connectivity, the SeNBcontrols one or more small cells, and is the eNB providing additionalradio resources for the UE, which is not the MeNB. Accordingly, the UEmay receive control signaling from the MeNB, and may receive data fromthe SeNB. The MeNB and SeNB has a network interface between thereof, andtherefore, information may be exchanged between the MeNB and SeNB.

Security function applied in the dual connectivity has not beendeveloped. Accordingly, a method for applying security information inthe dual connectivity may be required.

FIG. 9 shows an example of a method for applying security informationaccording to an embodiment of the present invention.

Referring to FIG. 9, in step S100, the UE obtains first securityinformation and second security information. It assumed that the UE hasa first connection for signaling with the MeNB, and the UE has a secondconnection for a user traffic with the SeNB. The first connection may bean RRC connection. The second connection may be an L2 connection.

The first security information may be received from the MeNB via asecurity mode command message. The first security information mayinclude of a first security parameter and/or a first security key. Forexample, the first security information may include both the firstsecurity parameter and the first security key. For example, the firstsecurity information may include only the first security parameter. Atthis case, the first security parameter may be received from the MeNBvia the security mode command message, and the first security key may bederived based on the first security parameter. The first security keymay be K_(RRCint), K_(RRCenc), or K_(UPenc) for the MeNB.

The second security information may be received from the MeNB via thesecurity mode command message. The second security information mayinclude of a second security parameter and/or a second security key. Forexample, the second security information may include both the secondsecurity parameter and the second security key. For example, the secondsecurity information may include only the second security parameter. Atthis case, the second security parameter may be received from the MeNBvia the security mode command message, and the second security key maybe derived based on the second security parameter. Alternatively, thesecond security key may be derived based on the first security key withthe first security parameter. The second security key may be K_(RRCint),K_(RRCenc), or K_(UPenc) for the SeNB.

In the description above, the security key is applied to integrityprotection or chipering. The first security parameter may contain nexthop and encryption algorithm. Also, a signaling key may be derived fromthe first security key with the first security parameter. The signalingkey may be used for the UE to encrypt user traffic from the MeNB and todecrypt user traffic received by the MeNB. Also, a user traffic key maybe derived from the second security key with the first securityparameter or the second security parameter.

In step S110, the UE applies the first security information to a firstset of RBs which is served by the MeNB. The first security informationmay be applied to one or more cells of the MeNB. Using the firstsecurity information, the UE may encrypt signaling transmitted from theMeNB and decrypting signaling received by the MeNB.

In step S120, the UE applies the second security information to a secondset of RBs which is served by the SeNB. The second security informationmay be applied to one or more cells of the SeNB. Using the secondsecurity information, the UE may encrypt user traffic transmitted fromthe SeNB and decrypting user traffic received by the SeNB;

FIG. 10 shows how a UE and MeNB generate security keys for radio RBsbetween the UE and macro cell according to an embodiment of the presentinvention. Referring to FIG. 10, the MeNB receives K_(PeNB), which is aneNB security key for the MeNB, from the MME. The MeNB derives twosecurity keys for RRC messages from K_(PeNB), i.e., K_(RRCint) forintegrity protection of RRC messages and K_(RRCenc) for chipering of RRCmessages.

FIG. 11 shows how a UE and SeNB generate security keys for radio RBsbetween the UE and small cell according to an embodiment of the presentinvention. Referring to FIG. 11, the SeNB receives K_(SeNB), which is aneNB security key for the SeNB, from the MME. Alternatively, the SeNBreceives K_(SeNB) from the MeNB. Then, SeNB derives a security key foruser traffic from K_(SeNB), i.e., K_(UPenc) for chipering of usertraffic.

Hereinafter, a security mode command procedure according to anembodiment of the present invention is described in detail.

When the UE is connected to both the MeNB and SeNB, the UE receives thesecurity mode command message and then generate security keys for boththe MeNB and SeNB according to the security mode command procedure asdescribed below. The UE may receive separate security mode commandmessages, one message for the MeNB and the other message for the SeNB.

Upon receiving the SecurityModeCommand message corresponding to thefirst group of one or more RBs or the first group of one or more cellsfrom the MeNB, UE shall:

1> derive the K_(eNB) key for the MeNB, i.e., the K_(MeNB);

1> derive the K_(RRCint) key associated with the integrityProtAlgorithmindicated in the SecurityModeCommand message;

1> request lower PDCP layer used for RRC messages in order to verify theintegrity protection of the SecurityModeCommand message, using thealgorithm indicated by the integrityProtAlgorithm as included in theSecurityModeCommand message and the K_(RRCint) key;

1> if the SecurityModeCommand message passes the integrity protectioncheck:

2> derive the K_(RRCenc) key associated with the cipheringAlgorithmindicated in the SecurityModeCommand message;

2> configure lower PDCP layer used for RRC messages in order to applyintegrity protection using the indicated algorithm and the K_(RRCint)key immediately, i.e., integrity protection shall be applied to allsubsequent messages received and sent by the UE, including theSecurityModeComplete message;

2> configure lower PDCP layer used for RRC messages in order to applyciphering using the indicated algorithm, the K_(RRCenc) key aftercompleting the procedure, i.e., ciphering shall be applied to allsubsequent messages received and sent by the UE, except for theSecurityModeComplete message which is sent unciphered;

2> consider AS security to be activated for the communication betweenthe UE and any cell of the MeNB (e.g., PCell);

2> submit the SecurityModeComplete message to lower layers fortransmission, upon which the procedure ends;

1> else:

2> continue using the configuration used prior to the reception of theSecurityModeCommand message, i.e., neither apply integrity protectionnor ciphering.

2> submit the SecurityModeFailure message to lower layers fortransmission, upon which the procedure ends.

After receiving the SecurityModeCommand corresponding to the MeNB fromthe MeNB, UE may receive another SecurityModeCommand corresponding tothe SeNB from either the PeNB or SeNB. The UE may receive theSecurityModeCommand corresponding to the SeNB after receiving a RRCconnection reconfiguration message that configures a cell of the SeNB asa serving cell.

Alternatively, the SecurityModeCommand corresponding to the MeNB canalso service as the SecurityModeCommand corresponding to the SeNB.Namely, a single SecurityModeCommand can be used for both the PeNB andSeNB.

Upon receiving the SecurityModeCommand corresponding to the second groupof one or more RBs or the second group of one or more cells from theSeNB, UE shall:

1> derive the K_(eNB) key for SeNB, i.e. K_(SeNB);

1> if the SecurityModeCommand message passes the integrity protectioncheck:

2> derive the K_(UPenc) key associated with the cipheringAlgorithmindicated in the SecurityModeCommand message;

2> if connected as an RN:

3> derive the K_(UPint) key associated with the integrityProtAlgorithmindicated in the SecurityModeCommand message;

2> configure lower PDCP layer used for user traffic in order to applyciphering using the indicated algorithm, the K_(UPenc) key aftercompleting the procedure, i.e., ciphering shall be applied to all usertraffic received and sent by the UE for DRBs between the UE and theSeNB.

2> if connected as an RN:

3> configure lower PDCP layer used for user traffic in order to applyintegrity protection using the indicated algorithm and the K_(UPint)key, for DRBs that are subsequently configured to apply integrityprotection, if any;

2> consider AS security to be activated for the communication betweenthe UE and any cell of the SeNB (e.g., SCell);

2> submit the SecurityModeComplete message to lower layers fortransmission, upon which the procedure ends;

1> else:

2> continue using the configuration used prior to the reception of theSecurityModeCommand message, i.e., neither apply integrity protectionnor ciphering.

2> submit the SecurityModeFailure message to lower layers fortransmission, upon which the procedure ends.

FIG. 12 is a block diagram showing wireless communication system toimplement an embodiment of the present invention.

An eNB 800 may include a processor 810, a memory 820 and a radiofrequency (RF) unit 830. The processor 810 may be configured toimplement proposed functions, procedures and/or methods described inthis description. Layers of the radio interface protocol may beimplemented in the processor 810. The memory 820 is operatively coupledwith the processor 810 and stores a variety of information to operatethe processor 810. The RF unit 830 is operatively coupled with theprocessor 810, and transmits and/or receives a radio signal.

A UE 900 may include a processor 910, a memory 920 and a RF unit 930.The processor 910 may be configured to implement proposed functions,procedures and/or methods described in this description. Layers of theradio interface protocol may be implemented in the processor 910. Thememory 920 is operatively coupled with the processor 910 and stores avariety of information to operate the processor 910. The RF unit 930 isoperatively coupled with the processor 910, and transmits and/orreceives a radio signal.

The processors 810, 910 may include application-specific integratedcircuit (ASIC), other chipset, logic circuit and/or data processingdevice. The memories 820, 920 may include read-only memory (ROM), randomaccess memory (RAM), flash memory, memory card, storage medium and/orother storage device. The RF units 830, 930 may include basebandcircuitry to process radio frequency signals. When the embodiments areimplemented in software, the techniques described herein can beimplemented with modules (e.g., procedures, functions, and so on) thatperform the functions described herein. The modules can be stored inmemories 820, 920 and executed by processors 810, 910. The memories 820,920 can be implemented within the processors 810, 910 or external to theprocessors 810, 910 in which case those can be communicatively coupledto the processors 810, 910 via various means as is known in the art.

In view of the exemplary systems described herein, methodologies thatmay be implemented in accordance with the disclosed subject matter havebeen described with reference to several flow diagrams. While forpurposed of simplicity, the methodologies are shown and described as aseries of steps or blocks, it is to be understood and appreciated thatthe claimed subject matter is not limited by the order of the steps orblocks, as some steps may occur in different orders or concurrently withother steps from what is depicted and described herein. Moreover, oneskilled in the art would understand that the steps illustrated in theflow diagram are not exclusive and other steps may be included or one ormore of the steps in the example flow diagram may be deleted withoutaffecting the scope and spirit of the present disclosure.

What is claimed is:
 1. A method performed by a user equipment (UE) in awireless communication system, the method comprising: establishing, bythe UE, both a first connection with a first base station and a secondconnection with a second base station; receiving, by the UE from thefirst base station, a security mode command message including a firstsecurity parameter; deriving, by the UE, a first security key for thefirst base station; deriving, by the UE, a signaling key associated withthe first security parameter from the first security key; applying, bythe UE, integrity protection or ciphering for signaling for the firstbase station based on the signaling key and the first securityparameter; while maintaining both the first connection with the firstbase station and the second connection with the second base station:deriving, by the UE, a second security key for the second base stationfrom the first security key; deriving, by the UE, a user traffic keyassociated with a second security parameter from the second securitykey; applying, by the UE, ciphering for user traffic for the second basestation based on the user traffic key and the second security parameter,wherein the second security key is derived, by the first base station,from the first security key and transmitted, by the first base station,to the second base station, and used by the second base station.
 2. Themethod of claim 1, wherein the first base station is a master eNB(MeNB), and wherein the second base station is a secondary eNB (SeNB).3. The method of claim 1, wherein the second security key is applied toradio bearers (RBs) of the second base station.
 4. The method of claim1, wherein the second security key is applied to one or more cells ofthe second base station.
 5. The method of claim 1, wherein the signalingkey is at least one of K_(RRCint) or K_(RRCenc).
 6. The method of claim1, wherein the user traffic key is K_(UPenc).
 7. The method of claim 1,wherein the first security parameter includes at least one of anintegrity protection algorithm for the first base station or a cipheringalgorithm for the first base station.
 8. The method of claim 1, whereinthe second security parameter includes a ciphering algorithm for thesecond base station.
 9. A user equipment (UE) in a wirelesscommunication, the UE comprising: a memory; a radio frequency (RF) unit;and a processor, operably coupled to the memory and the RF unit, andconfigured to: establish both a first connection with a first basestation and a second connection with a second base station, control theRF unit to receive, from the first base station, a security mode commandmessage including a first security parameter; derive a first securitykey for the first base station; derive a signaling key associated withthe first security parameter from the first security key; applyintegrity protection or ciphering for signaling for the first basestation based on the signaling key and the first security parameter;while maintaining both the first connection with the first base stationand the second connection with the second base station: derive a secondsecurity key for the second base station from the first security key;derive a user traffic key associated with a second security parameterfrom the second security key; and apply ciphering for user traffic forthe second base station based on the user traffic key and the secondsecurity parameter, wherein the second security key is derived, by thefirst base station, from the first security key and transmitted, by thefirst base station, to the second base station, and used by the secondbase station.
 10. The UE of claim 9, wherein the first base station is amaster eNB (MeNB), and wherein the second base station is a secondaryeNB (SeNB).
 11. The UE of claim 9, wherein the second security key isapplied to radio bearers (RBs) of the second base station.
 12. The UE ofclaim 9, wherein the second security key is applied to one or more cellsof the second base station.
 13. The UE of claim 9, wherein the signalingkey is at least one of K_(RRCint) or K_(RRCenc).
 14. The UE of claim 9,wherein the user traffic key is K_(UPenc).
 15. The method of claim 9,wherein the first security parameter includes at least one of anintegrity protection algorithm for the first base station or a cipheringalgorithm for the first base station.
 16. The method of claim 9, whereinthe second security parameter includes a ciphering algorithm for thesecond base station.
 17. A processor for a wireless communication devicein a wireless communication, wherein the processor is configured to:establish both a first connection with a first base station and a secondconnection with a second base station, control the wirelesscommunication device unit to receive, from the first base station, asecurity mode command message including a first security parameter;derive a first security key for the first base station; derive asignaling key associated with the first security parameter from thefirst security key; apply integrity protection or ciphering forsignaling for the first base station based on the signaling key and thefirst security parameter; while maintaining both the first connectionwith the first base station and the second connection with the secondbase station: derive a second security key for the second base stationfrom the first security key; derive a user traffic key associated with asecond security parameter from the second security key; and applyciphering for user traffic for the second base station based on the usertraffic key and the second security parameter, wherein the secondsecurity key is derived, by the first base station, from the firstsecurity key and transmitted, by the first base station, to the secondbase station, and used by the second base station.